

Major security objectives does not demand that they all be attained simultaneously. In particular, all opportunities to improve the ability of constituted leaders to control the forces in a deliberate, discriminating fashion, and to enlarge the range of alternative options available to them, should be exploited on an immediate and continuing basis.

...and other ... of the ... should be ... of the world. ... might require ... of the U. S. and ... of the Allies.

The U. S. regards the threat of local aggression as endangering its vital interests. It and its Allies must therefore be prepared to deter or, if necessary, to repel local aggression wherever and whenever such aggression may take place. The specific goals which the local war policy which the U. S. seeks to attain are:

1. The capability on the part of Allies and other members of the Free World to take a large share of the burden of deterring and repelling local aggression.

2. The capability on the part of the U. S. to respond to local aggression rapidly, wherever it may occur and when it does occur.

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Since it is the policy of the U. S. to deter aggression, and to raise the threshold at which the use of nuclear weapons would be required in the event of war, our allies will be advised that their possession of substantial, ready, non-nuclear capabilities is regarded as vital to the U. S. as well as to themselves. They will also be advised that their voice in our counsels with the U. S. will be much more a function of their non-nuclear than of their nuclear capabilities. They will be encouraged to increase their non-nuclear capabilities, research and development to the extent that this is economically and politically feasible. The U. S. will support them in this enterprise. It will not assist them to acquire nuclear weapons under present circumstances.

NATO is of course the primary area of interest of the U. S. in the Free World.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization represents the alliance in which the U. S. sets the greatest store. The integrity and independence of Western Europe are of vital interest to the U. S. Western Europe has the resources to make a very large contribution to the defense of the Free World. The broad outlines of our military policy toward NATO are as follows:

1. First priority should be given, in NATO programs for the European area, to preparing for contingencies short of nuclear or massive non-nuclear attack.

2. NATO should also be prepared to meet nuclear and massive non-nuclear attack in the theater, but not to a degree that would divert

needed resources from non-nuclear programs for the defense of the theater, or from programs to assure an ample and protected U. S. central war capability.

3. The objectives of NATO's non-nuclear forces should be the containment of Soviet forces now in or rapidly deployable to Central Europe for a period sufficient to enable the Russians to appreciate the wider risks of the course on which they have embarked, and the defeat of any Soviet aggression of lesser size. The U. S. should also support the development of a mobile task force to help deal with threats to NATO's flanks.

4. U. S. ground forces will be retained in Europe at present strength for the foreseeable future. However, consistent with the primary importance of protecting the NATO area, certain of these forces may be required temporarily to undertake local military operations outside the European theater.

5. NATO non-nuclear research and development and coordinated production will be encouraged, as will the further rationalization and integration of national defenses in the NATO area.

6. Nuclear weapons will be retained in Europe. Their composition, numbers, and siting will be changed in accordance with changing technology and NATO and Communist Bloc force structures.

7. Measures to improve the survivability, security, and responsiveness, of nuclear capabilities in Europe will be adopted.

8. So far as the U. S. is concerned, it is vital that the use of the

for part of its nuclear power not be subject to veto. It is not essential that the part of that power deployed in Europe be free of veto. It is, however, most important to the U. S. that the use of nuclear weapons by the forces of other nations in Europe be subject to American veto and control. Therefore, the concept of a veto by another than ourselves over the nuclear forces located in the European theater is not contrary to our interests.

9. Until such time as the North Atlantic Council has worked out agreed guidelines concerning the use of nuclear weapons, the President will make clear his readiness and intent to use them if NATO forces have been subjected to nuclear attack or are about to be overwhelmed by non-nuclear forces.

10. The U. S. is prepared to commit additional nuclear forces based outside of Europe to NATO. Deployment and targeting of these forces will be the duty of the responsible NATO commands.

11. In view of these commitments, the U. S. will discourage its NATO allies from acquiring or retaining independent nuclear capabilities. The U. S. should not facilitate European development or production of advanced delivery systems primarily designed for nuclear weapons delivery.

Section I. Policy for Military Assistance Programs

The U. S. is vitally interested in promoting the economic growth, political stability, and development of democratic institutions within the

World. While fulfilling these goals it is necessary that the nations of the Free World be made secure both against internal subversion and external aggression. Security from these dangers is, in fact, a prerequisite to the attainment of longer-range economic and political objectives. It is desirable, moreover, for the nations of the Free World to be capable of deterring or thwarting both internal subversion and local aggression without the intervention of U. S. armed forces.

Some nations in danger of Communist aggression do not have the resources to maintain armed forces adequate to their needs and at the same time promote economic growth and political stability. Internal subversion may represent as great a problem to other members of the Free World as aggression from the outside. Still other nations may have military needs and aspirations of a different character. Allocations of resources to assist these countries must be determined in the full realization that no single nation on the periphery of the Communist Bloc could withstand, or hope to withstand, the full weight of Sino-Soviet military power. In some instances it may therefore be desirable to support smaller but more efficient forces than are currently being maintained. In other instances it may be important to concentrate on forces designed to uphold internal security, or on the means necessary to facilitate U. S. and allied military support. In determining the level of allied and indigenous forces to be supported, account should be taken of the utility of developing regions of strength around the Sino-Soviet periphery

to prevent unauthorized military acts or accidents, and unpremeditated

help offset inevitable weaknesses in other regions. The substantially lower cost of supporting indigenous forces as compared with U. S. forces should also be taken into account. In all instances it seems desirable to assist in the development of capabilities sufficient to make a potential enemy commit an overt act of aggression in order to achieve his ends.

Pending a review of current military assistance programs, their worth will be judged by their contribution to one or more of the following objectives:

1. The maintenance of armed forces at least adequate to provide initial strong resistance to armed aggression.
2. The maintenance of forces capable of achieving internal security through police operations, frontier guard, and counter-guerrilla activities.
3. The creation or maintenance of U. S. bases and base rights as well as the facilities to enable the U. S. and its allies to support an attacked country in the most expeditious possible manner.
4. The support of U. S. policies by the government and armed forces of the assisted country.
5. The prevention or reduction of dependence on Sino-Soviet assistance by the country being supported.

The U. S. will continue military assistance programs aimed at these objectives for the foreseeable future. Assistance will be confined (insofar as possible) to the support of non-nuclear capabilities and will be tailored to the specific security needs of each assisted country. It will not be used to enable other countries to develop strategic

Where our allies are concerned, it seems unlikely in the near future that they will be able, either independently or collectively, to develop significant nuclear capabilities. Furthermore, the widespread diffusion of nuclear weapons could promote disunity, ^{in the Western Alliance,} divert resources from non-nuclear tasks, make nuclear escalation of local war more likely, increase the chance of accidents and unauthorized acts, and would almost certainly complicate the problem of controlling the course and character of a nuclear war if it did occur. It would also make arms control more difficult.

To the extent feasible, the U. S. will therefore continue to maintain and control the nuclear forces necessary to the defense of the Free World. The U. S. should make it evident abroad that a policy of renouncing independent nuclear capabilities will be welcomed by the U. S. as a contribution to world stability. Where other countries possess or acquire nuclear weapons, they will be encouraged to place these weapons under bilateral or multilateral commands in which the U. S. would have a veto over their use and a major voice in the process of planning for their employment. U. S. nuclear weapons are required by law to remain under U. S. control in peacetime. Strict adherence to the law will remain unquestioned.

In the circumstances, the main contribution of the alliances to which the U. S. is a party will be regarded as that of repelling local aggression by non-nuclear means. Where necessary, the U. S. will supply the nuclear support required in a local war.

In view of the dangers of local and central war, it is equally important that the intelligence operations of the U. S. be able to function in other than normal peacetime conditions. Particular attention will be given to:

1. Having personnel and equipment available on a standby basis for use in special collection efforts under conditions of extreme international tension. At all times, plans will be ready for employing this standby capability to refine and fill in gaps in our current knowledge.

2. Improving the capability of the intelligence community to survive, even in the most adverse conditions of combat, and continue operations. Such improvements will include the protection of essential personnel and communications.

3. Developing plans and preparations for the special requirements generated by the wartime operation and control of U. S. forces. This should include preparations to take advantage of wartime opportunities to provide intelligence of importance to the security of the United States.

This guidance applies to both central and local war.

4. Preparing measures of cover and deception for use in wartime. Central war as well as local war contingencies will be analyzed in the preparation of these measures,

Para-military and covert capabilities will also receive increased support and additional resources. These techniques will be regarded as a normal and important part of the U. S. capability to deal with the efforts

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Programs will be administered with due regard for the multiplicity of U. S. interests in each of the assisted countries. Since political, economic, and security objectives are interdependent, the means for their achievement should be coordinated and made mutually reinforcing.

Section J. Policy for Intelligence and Para-Military Operations

Owing to the secrecy and deception practiced by the Communist Bloc, it remains especially important for the United States to continue and improve its intelligence operations. These operations will receive the full support of the government. Two areas in particular warrant determined efforts.

Because of the uncertainties surrounding Communist military research, development, and procurement it is of the utmost importance that national intelligence estimates concerning the future force structure and posture of the Communist Bloc - and especially the longer-range estimates - be based on the best possible intelligence collection programs and methods of analysis and estimation. Where necessary, they should also show not only single estimates, but also a range of alternatives in order to reflect the uncertainties which are necessarily inherent in such projections. The military plans and programs of the United States require both the admission of uncertainty and a reasoned estimate of its probable range.

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of the Communist Bloc to expand its influence. Plans and preparations for such operations should not be confined to the activities of several individuals, nor to activities within the Free World only. They should include covert operations of substantially greater magnitude, and they should consider targets within the Communist Bloc as well as within the Free World.

Section K. Policy for Research and Development

Technology is dynamic and changes in it are difficult to predict. There will probably be surprising developments in the 1960's just as there certainly have been in the 1940's and 1950's. Moreover, owing to the rapid advance of Soviet technology, there is as great a likelihood that the Soviets will surprise us as that we will surprise them.

There is also great uncertainty about the size and composition of future Soviet military capabilities.

These factors, coupled with the possibility that other countries will acquire sophisticated nuclear weapons systems, make it essential that we hedge against uncertainty. We should be able to adapt our military posture to a variety of contingencies and we must keep open the options to do so.

Keeping options open means that we should start development programs in the full realization that changed and unforeseen circumstances

May 19, 1961
achievement of peace terms which are compatible with the long-range objectives of the United States. The goal of the United States is not to destroy any nation, but, if war should occur, to frustrate and defeat opposing military forces and to create the conditions under which the opponents will become responsible members of the international community. It is in the interest of the United States to achieve its wartime objectives while limiting the destructiveness of warfare, whether it be nuclear or non-nuclear, local or global. Specifically, the United States does not hold all the people of Russia, China, or the Satellite nations responsible for the acts of their governments. Consequently, it is not an objective of the United States to maximize the number of people killed in the Communist Bloc in the event of war.

These are imposing objectives for the immediate future. They cannot be easily achieved. But the Free World, led as it must be by the United States, is substantially more powerful than the Communist Bloc. There is no adequate reason why the threats that confront us cannot be successfully countered and the opportunities successfully exploited.

Section E. Military Problems and Objectives

There are a number of ways in which the security interests of the United States could be jeopardized now and in the future. Among the most serious possibilities are:

1. A deliberate major nuclear assault on the United States.
2. A major assault on an area of vital interest to the United States, in particular on that area covered by the North Atlantic Treaty.
3. A deliberate nuclear attack on the United States by a minor nuclear power, or nuclear conflict between minor nuclear powers which could involve the major nuclear powers.
4. Nuclear warfare resulting from accidents, misinterpretations of incidents or intentions, false alarms, or unauthorized actions.
5. Local aggression either in the form of invasion or subversion against an ally of the United States or against a state whose independence and integrity is considered of importance to the United States.
6. Escalation of a local conflict, especially a local conflict in which the armed forces of the United States and the Sino-Soviet Bloc are directly involved.
7. An accident, unauthorized action, or sabotage involving detonation of a nuclear weapon which could lead to a degradation of readiness and alert measures, loss of base rights, weakening of alliances, or major political concessions by an ally in time of crisis.

These possibilities dictate multiple security objectives for the United States at all times. The most urgent objectives are:

1. To deter any deliberate nuclear assault upon the United States or its Allies.
2. To deter or frustrate attempts by the Sino-Soviet Bloc to extend to political, military and ideological influence by the threat or

Section F. Policy for Central War Posture and Strategy

Goals

The primary objectives of U. S. policy with respect to central war must be to deter deliberate attack and prevent unintended outbreak. The U. S. rejects armed aggression as a means of enhancing its security; nor can major thermonuclear war be its preferred instrument in meeting armed aggression by others. It is an object of U. S. policy that there be adequate alternatives to the initiation by the U. S. of central war. Yet if central war is forced upon the United States, U. S. military strength must still serve multiple national objectives.

Central war can result from a variety of causes other than the calculated and objective view of enemy leaders that they can achieve decisive superiority over the U. S. by deliberate surprise attack. National planning cannot safely be based on the assumption that deterrence will certainly succeed, that unpremeditated nuclear attacks cannot occur, or that major aggression, undeterred, will never challenge the U. S. to fulfill its commitments to Allies and to protect its security by risking or waging central war. Neither can it regard all possible outcomes of a central war as indistinguishable. In some circumstances, even the best outcome attainable in central war may represent unprecedented catastrophe; yet outcomes very significantly worse than the best, both in civil and military aspects, may also be possible, and it will remain an urgent goal of U. S. security policy to forestall them.

Thus, central war posture and strategy must continuously be tested not only for ability to prevent deliberate or undeliberated attack but for ability to secure basic national objectives in wartime. Solutions to these separate problems can and should be chosen to reinforce each other.

The most urgent military goal in central war is to preclude the prospect of an unarmed U. S. confronting armed opponents. It is essential that no enemy be able to disarm the U. S. by surprise attack on forces or controls; it is equally important that the U. S. not disarm itself, by expending all ready forces in initial attacks that cannot guarantee to disarm the opponent. Although the Soviet Union must be left in no doubt that its military strength would be drastically reduced in any central war, there may be future circumstances in which U. S. countermilitary action alone could not disarm it totally in initial attack; the Soviets might be able to retain sizeable forces that were initially untargetable or that could be destroyed only at a highly unfavorable rate of exchange in terms of residual capability. To the extent that conservative planning must allow for the survival of such Soviet forces, U. S. posture and strategy must permit the retention of ready and uncommitted forces in reserve, at least comparable to estimated Soviet residual forces in ability to inflict further damage or to influence further the military balance. These forces must remain, under all circumstances of enemy attack, under effective control by authorized political leadership.

A visible and indisputable capability to achieve this basic military

ack any incentive. It guarantees that even a well-designed surprise attack would be futile and costly; an assault could neither win military superiority nor reduce to acceptable proportions the nuclear retaliation that could be launched by U. S. forces.

At the same time, the capabilities required for this fundamental task serve the other wartime goals of minimizing damage to the U. S. and its Allies and forcing a conclusion to the war on advantageous terms. U. S. countermilitary action reduces enemy capability to inflict further damage or to continue the war; the survival of sizeable U. S. ready residual forces, threatening, by their very existence, enemy targets surviving or deliberately left unhit in initial attacks, can destroy the will or surviving enemy leaders to pursue unrestricted attacks or to continue the war.

The latter ability to influence enemy will might be particularly vital in circumstances when attacks upon enemy capabilities alone could not deprive enemy forces of a residual ability to inflict grave damage. Under those same circumstances, it might appear probable that attacks against high governmental and military command centers, or indiscriminate initial attacks on all major urban-industrial centers would fail to inhibit punitive retaliation by surviving enemy units, but would instead eliminate the possibility that enemy response could be controlled or terminated to U. S. advantage.

The ability of U. S. ready forces held in reserve to extend deterrence, in some degree, into the wartime period, can have important effect not only upon the later stages of hostilities but upon the damage deliberately

...initial assault. Whether the enemy attack is premeditated, irrational, or based on false alarm, initial enemy tactics will reflect his preattack planning, which in turn reflects his image of U. S. capabilities and options. The prospect of confronting sizeable, protected and controlled U. S. reserve forces after any attack should deter him from planning unrestricted attacks on U. S. or Allied society under any circumstances; it should further induce him to undertake preparation for post-attack flexibility, control, and information. It thus lays the groundwork, if war should occur, for deterring unrestricted enemy attacks and for deterring continuance of hostilities.

Not all objectives can be achieved with equal confidence. But a capability to preclude, with high confidence, enemy residual military superiority at any stage of the conflict offers best hope not only of deterring deliberate attack but, if war occurs, of minimizing damage to the U. S. and its Allies and of stopping the war on the most advantageous terms possible.

At the same time, the posture and strategy for deterring or waging central war must be consistent with efforts to minimize the likelihood of accidents, unauthorized actions or unintended nuclear exchanges, to reduce the spread of nuclear weapons, to deter or defeat local aggression, and to enhance U. S. security by safeguarded arms control agreements and by non-military means.

Contingencies

Posture and strategy for central war must be designed to achieve these various U. S. security objectives under a spectrum of contingencies.

must be intended to deter not only a conservative decision-maker in the absence of national or international tension, but a wishful or frightened opponent in a time of crisis, when his alternatives to attack upon the U. S. might also seem dangerous to him. Its ability to deter must be able to withstand sizeable enemy miscalculation of U. S. intentions or capabilities, and should offer hope of withstanding unforeseen technological shifts. Its ability to prevent or to contain the political and military consequences of accidents, unauthorized actions, false alarms or "third party" actions must be considered for varied situations of international tension and local war, when such incidents are both more likely and more dangerous than in periods of relative calm.

If central war should occur, despite U. S. efforts to reduce its likelihood, there could be wide variance in the circumstances of initiation, enemy posture and readiness, enemy tactics, the results of initial attacks, the attitudes and actions of Allies on both sides, and enemy wartime objectives. Ability to achieve U. S. wartime objectives would depend upon ability to adapt U. S. strategic response to these various circumstances, which might be unforeseen, ambiguous, or both. A single detonation or several might presage a major assault, or come by accident, unauthorized action to attack by a minor power. A surprise attack might be calculated and well-designed or a hasty response to false tactical warning or miscalculation of U. S. intentions. It might be well or poorly executed, providing much warning or none; retaining sizeable, protected enemy reserves or few; destroying all but the most protected U. S. forces or failing to do so. It

might occur
obscure
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not direct heavy initial assault against U. S. and Allied civil society and major command centers or it might carefully avoid such targets. Central war might culminate an escalating local war, preceded by mobilization, deployment and heightened alert on both sides; or an attack might follow a period of normal alert. Enemy posture and readiness might lack major vulnerability, assuring the survival under counterforce attack of major mobile, concealed or hardened enemy forces; or the enemy may have failed to protect parts of his system effectively.

This list of possibilities is not exhaustive. Intermediate situations between the extremes cited may offer special problems; and "surprises" in the form of wholly unforeseen circumstances are likely.

Among all these contingencies, it is not exclusively the "worst" cases or even the most likely ones that deserve attention; the design of posture and strategy should provide insurance against a broad range of uncertain possibilities. It is necessary to be able to exploit even improbably favorable wartime possibilities, such as windfalls of intelligence or warning, badly executed enemy attack, or urgent desire of leaders of one or more enemy nations to surrender after early operation. A capability for flexible response under high-level, informed and experienced political leadership may be most critical, and most rewarding, in such favorable cases, or in the ambiguous and urgent circumstances presented by accident, unauthorized action, "third party" attack, enemy false alarm or escalation of local war. It is in these situations that the need for a range of options alternative to an all-out,

discriminating strategic response may be most urgent; important capabilities would include a series of well-designed alerting actions and defensive measures, communication with Allies and potential enemies, augmentation of intelligence and warning systems, and implementation of threats and discriminating counterforce attacks.

Requirements

To satisfy these demands, military posture for central war should acquire, as soon as possible and to the utmost extent practicable, the following general characteristics:

1. Survival and endurance. Strategic offensive forces, in major strength, should be capable of surviving an enemy surprise attack without essential reliance upon quick reaction to warning. A sizeable fraction of such forces should be capable of enduring in a wartime environment under prolonged reattack, as a ready reserve force responsive to flexible, centralized control.
2. Strict positive control. Control over the initiation and overall conduct of nuclear war should be exercised at all times by highest national authority. The President will determine and review procedures for such control, including any delegation of basic decisions under any circumstances of Presidential inability to control. There should be reliable physical safeguards against accident or unauthorized action involving nuclear weapons, including weapons under dual control with an Ally; in particular, weapons on high alert status, in mobile launchers, and in planes launched under

ive control. Authorized procedures and protected control capabilities should assure an opponent of an effective, properly authorized response under all circumstances of attack, without any reliance upon the possibility of unauthorized initiative.

3. Information. Reliable, unequivocal bomb alarm detectors and bomb alarm signals at key warning, communications and command points and all major offensive force bases, and detectors at all major cities, should be provided to assure any opponent that dependable notification of any surprise attack cannot be eliminated. Such a system should be protected under attack to a degree which will enable it to provide at least gross indications of the size and nature of enemy attack, the status of U. S. bases and the level of damage to U. S. society. So far as practicable, reliable information, status-reporting, intelligence, sensor, and reconnaissance systems, including protected post-attack capabilities, should be provided to furnish more discriminating knowledge of the source and nature of attack, U. S. and enemy residual capability, and damage to U. S., Allied, and enemy societies. Means should be provided for prompt, reliable and unequivocal indication of the status of higher command centers to all units, permitting orderly devolution of command in accordance with authorized procedures.

4. Force flexibility. Strategic offensive forces, both missiles and aircraft, should be capable of selective commitment against alternative targets, with capability for rapid retargeting after attack. Forces held in

reserve should have capability for continued countermilitary action, as well as retaliatory attacks against non-military targets.

5. Countermilitary capability. Offensive counterforce capabilities, active defenses and passive defenses, supported by warning and reconnaissance systems, should be able to reduce enemy residual military capability at least to levels that will ensure the strategic advantage of U. S. residual forces; they should be equipped to exploit possible vulnerabilities in Soviet posture or gross inefficiencies in Soviet planning or execution of attacks. These measures should be complemented by (a) geographic separation of U. S. strategic forces from population centers to the fullest extent consistent with other military objectives; (b) such active anti-bomber and anti-missile defenses of cities as are judged to be effective; (c) civil defense which, at a minimum, provides adequate fallout protection and recovery capability from nuclear attack directed at important U. S. military strengths.

6. Contingency planning. To permit rapid selective responses on the basis of information available at the outset of hostilities and after, contingency plans should be provided corresponding to gross differences in the circumstances and course of central war. In particular, alternative options should include counterforce operations carefully avoiding major enemy cities while retaining U. S. ready residual forces to threaten these targets; the option to exclude major control centers from counterforce attacks

may make some of these programs unnecessary by the time they are completed. It means that we may have to cancel others even though substantial resources have been invested them.

We should also procure a reduction in leadtime, being prepared to make decisions at an early date to buy production capabilities that we may never use. To the end of reducing both cost and lead time we should be prepared to place major development projects in the hands of competent individuals and to reduce to a minimum bureaucratic interference with management of these projects.

In short, a substantial and diversified military research and development effort is clearly a necessity. It will be encouraged and supported.

This effort should include, as a high priority, support of research on basic physical phenomena which might be translated into new weapons for the armed forces. It should also include support of policy-oriented research designed to help us understand better how to achieve our security goals in a complex and changing world.

Section L. Policy for the Control and Reduction of Armaments

The maintenance of the security interests of the United States under present conditions requires that the United States and its Allies have at

their disposal armed forces sufficient to deter or defeat any aggression, whether it be directed against an Ally or against the United States itself, whether nuclear or non-nuclear weapons are employed. So long as the Communist Bloc continues its efforts to disrupt and subjugate the Free World, the retention of military power ample for these purposes will remain of the utmost importance. However, it is not in the interest of the United States, in retaining this power, to intensify the arms race. Nor is it in our interest to engage in disarmament or arms control simply to save money. The United States can afford and will spend whatever is required to maintain its security.

In the circumstances, certain principles apply to the U. S. approach to arms control and disarmament. They are:

1. Agreements in this area are not to be regarded as a good in themselves. Arms control policy is to be considered as a means of securing the vital interests of the United States. Not only is it to be judged by the same criteria as defense policy, arms control policy and defense

policy are identical. *Arms control is one of the means of defense.*

2. Prospective agreements are to be scrutinized not only for their effect on the security of the United States, but also for their effect on the security of our Allies.

3. Tacit agreements will be regarded as having utility at least equal to formal agreements. Allowing for the secrecy of the Communist Bloc, where such tacit agreements appear to be in force, and contribute

to the security of the United States and its Allies, they will be observed. Additional tacit agreements that would prove advantageous will be sought.

4. Should circumstances change, and a world order emerge in which disputes could be settled equitably and without resort to force, the United States would be interested in the controlled reduction of armaments to a low level.

At the present time, the United States will continue to work toward arms reduction and control while maintaining a suitable defense posture. Where negotiations for the reduction of armament are not already in progress, the United States will prepare contingent positions for their eventuality. These preparations will take due account of evolving technology, the comparative risks of entering into various possible agreements and of not doing so. These preparations should also take account of the sanctions or other actions that would be available and useful in the event that such an agreement were violated or were to break down.

The reduction of armaments is a goal sought by the United States, provided that such reduction does not weaken the United States and its Allies relative to their prospective enemies. But this goal by no means precludes efforts at the control of existing and future armaments in such a way as to reduce the likelihood of wars inimical to the interests of the United States. Measures to diminish the probability of surprise attack, to prevent unauthorized military acts or accidents, and unpremeditated

asty actions - especially with nuclear weapons - are among those that will continue to receive high priority attention and analysis.

The importance of arms control is such that, pending the conclusion of satisfactory international agreements to this end, the United States unilaterally will take measures designed to reduce the vulnerability of its forces, to strengthen the ability of the highest national authority to exercise unhurried, deliberate, and flexible control over their use, and to discourage the diffusion of nuclear weapons and advanced delivery capabilities to other countries. Such measures will be regarded not only as increasing the national security, but also as important contributions to the control of armaments.